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Of Property Rights and Rights to Property
JAMES E. KRIER*
In 2004, President George W. Bush said, “I believe in private property
so much, I want everyone in America to have some.”1 Much earlier, in
1948, an economics professor from the University of Texas expressed the
same sentiment in strikingly similar terms. When asked by an investigatory
committee of the Texas legislature whether he favored private property, he
replied, “I do . . . and so strongly that I want everyone in Texas to have
some.”2
Even putting aside the possibility that the President’s speechwriters
found inspiration in an unacknowledged source, there are several interesting
things to note about these two statements. More than a half-century stands
between them. One speaker, President Bush, was and is a Republican
politician somewhat to the right. The economist, in contrast, was a wellknown leftist. Yet despite the distance between the two men in years and
ideological outlooks, both seemed to endorse the property system and the
wide distribution of property rights. I am inclined to think that most
Americans would express similar sentiments today, although the meanings
they attach to their words might vary considerably when it comes down to
particulars. And regarding particulars, I am confident that there is much
less contentiousness about the operation of the property system for any
given distribution of rights then there is about what the actual distribution of

*
Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. The remarks here have been
prompted by a conversation with (as opposed to a speech to) students and faculty of Ohio Northern
University, Pettit College of Law, as part of the Dean’s Lecture Series. I am grateful to Dean Rick Bales
and the faculty and students of the law school for providing the opportunity to talk with them about
property. Two themes ran through our conversation: first, the importance of property rights, and,
second, concerns about the distributive implications of property rights. Those are the themes pursued
here.
1. Remarks to the Republican Governors Association, 1 PUB. PAPERS 260 (Feb. 23, 2004).
Bush repeated his views on private property in almost exactly the same words on seven subsequent
occasions over the months of February through May 2004. See Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Luncheon in
Louisville, 1 PUB. PAPERS 280 (Feb. 26, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Reception in Los Angeles, 1
PUB. PAPERS 306 (Mar. 3, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Luncheon in Santa Clara, California, 1
PUB. PAPERS 321 (Mar. 4, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Luncheon in Dallas, Texas, 1 PUB. PAPERS
333 (Mar. 8, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Reception in Houston, Texas, 1 PUB. PAPERS 338 (Mar.
8, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Reception in East Meadow, New York, 1 PUB. PAPERS 369 (Mar.
11, 2004); Remarks at the American Conservative Union 40th Anniversary Gala, 1 PUB. PAPERS 872
(May 13, 2004).
2. DON CARLETON, RED SCARE: RIGHT-WING HYSTERIA, FIFTIES FANATICISM, AND THEIR
LEGACY IN TEXAS 22 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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rights should be. In other words, property rights are one thing, and rights to
property quite another.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS
According to William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, written on the eve of the American Revolution and extraordinarily
influential in the early legal history of the United States, “There is nothing
which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right of property.”3 Property doctrine has changed a lot
since Blackstone’s time, of course, but his words about property rights are,
as Stuart Banner notes, “just as true today.”4 What accounts for mankind’s
high regard for property?
One view, supported by theory and evidence, suggests that in the course
of natural evolution, respect for possession came to be hardwired into the
human brain. Nonhuman animals, runs the account, had found a
reproductive advantage by behaving in the following manner: They
defended items and territories in their possession, but deferred to those in
the possession of others.5 Humans appear to have learned, early in their
history, that it was advantageous to behave in the same manner, and
especially after the invention of agriculture about ten millennia ago.6
Interestingly, the de facto norm of deference to possession that developed
among humans preceded the advent of governments and formal legal
systems. To be sure, the norm amounted to less than a full-blown de jure
system of property rights, but it nevertheless provided the core concept—
recognition of a right in possessors to exclude others from their possessions.
When governments and formal property systems did eventuate, virtually all
of them adopted a right to exclude as a central feature of their property
regimes.7
Today, the right to exclude is generally regarded as the sine qua non of
property.8 Notice that the right to exclude logically implies two other
3. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
4. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 2
(2011).
5. See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982).
6. For a full discussion of the leading literature, see James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and
the Origin of Property, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 150-58 (2009). The rise of agriculture also provoked
the development of constructive possession, such that deference extended not just to things one actually
possessed, but also to things carrying indicia of belonging to some person even though the person is
absent for the moment, such as tilled fields. See id. at 158.
7. Hence the notion that possession is the root to title or the origin of property. See, e.g., Richard
A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as
the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others . . . is the sine qua non. Give someone the right to exclude . . . and
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rights. Namely, a right to use and a right to transfer to third parties. After
all, if there is a right (de facto or de jure) to exclude, that is equivalent to
saying that owners are free to use what is theirs, and also free to convey
what is theirs to others who thereby become the new owners with the same
rights as the erstwhile ones. All of these rights are in rem—they empower
owners as against the world at large, providing, in Blackstone’s famous
words, “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe.”9
No wonder humankind would find property an attractive institution.
From the viewpoint of individuals, property provides owners a large degree
of autonomy, privacy, and freedom within their domains. From the
viewpoint of society at large, it provides citizens with incentives to invest in
resources, manage them in productive fashion, and transfer them to others
as may suit their preferences.
So property rights seem to be a very good thing—for those who have
some.
II. RIGHTS TO PROPERTY
A. In General
We saw above that voices from across the political spectrum claim that
they approve of property so much that they want everyone to have some,
but (as also noted earlier) it is not at all clear what these words might mean
to any particular person who expresses such a sentiment.10 For example,
someone like President Bush would probably approve of property even if
not everyone has some, whereas the economist from the University of Texas
might approve of property only if everyone has some. In any event, it is not
saying much to endorse a property system so long as it provides “some”
property for everyone without explaining how much property, and of what
kinds. Jeremy Waldron has concluded, after the most careful scrutiny,
“there is no right-based argument to be found which provides an adequate
justification for a society in which some people have lots of property and
you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property”). The right
to exclude may be shared. Suppose, for example, a limited-access commons owned by 100 people as
tenants in common. No common owner may exclude any other common owner, but may exclude
anyone else. A limited-access commons, then, is common property as among the commoners, but
private property as between the common owners and the rest of the world. (Bear in mind, then, that
“private” property is not limited to sole proprietorship, meaning a single owner.) A universal commons
is not a kind of property at all, because by definition everyone has a right of access and thus no one has a
right to exclude.
9. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
10. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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many have next to none.”11 In other words, even if we can find justification
for a system of private property, this does not mean we can find justification
for any old system, without regard to its particular content. President Bush
was speaking of property for everyone in the context of advocating various
initiatives on his administration’s agenda to support home ownership, small
business ownership, private retirement accounts, and health care accounts.
What the economist’s program (if any) might have been, I do not know, but
I expect it would be along the lines of property for everyone sufficient to
provide a decent life for each person, which seems not to have been on
Bush’s agenda.
There is a contemporary philosophical literature endorsing a right to
property of roughly the sort I have imagined the Texas economist favoring.
Stephen Munzer, for instance, argues that property systems—even systems
where some have more property than others—are justifiable only if “(1)
everyone has a minimum amount of property and (2) the inequalities do not
undermine a fully human life in society.”12 Munzer refers to the first clause
as the Floor Thesis and the latter as the Gap Thesis.13 Under the Floor
Thesis, the minimum property holdings rightly required might vary with the
society or culture in question, but must provide personal items, food,
shelter, and funds for or access to education and health care in amounts
sufficient to satisfy basic human needs and ensure the development of basic
human capabilities.14 The Gap Thesis is harder to summarize in a few
words, but its essence is as follows: Even if everyone has the required
minimum property holdings, large gaps between the best off and the worst
off are still unjustifiable if they “interfere[] with appropriate amounts of
control, privacy, and individuality, with the development of property-related
virtues, and with the opportunities for meaningful work.”15 Munzer
mentions various examples of what he has in mind: Extreme and visible
inequalities can lower self-esteem and create understandable resentment, be
an affront to a sense of equal moral worth, and distort the operations of legal
and political processes.16
B. Snapshots of Some Data
How does the United States measure up in terms of the foregoing?
Begin with the Floor Thesis and consider the country’s poverty rate.
Although there is contention about the way the federal government
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1988).
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 227 (1990).
Id. at 229.
See id. at 244-46.
Id. at 247-48.
See id. at 249.
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calculates the poverty threshold, and thus the poverty rate, in essence the
rate indicates the percentage of the population with insufficient income (not
including capital gains or noncash benefits from government programs) to
purchase the food, clothing, health care, and shelter needed to meet the
minimum threshold standards. The official poverty rate in 2013 was
14.5%.17 Almost 44% of this group (about twenty million people) lived in
families with incomes below one-half of their poverty threshold.18 The
poverty rate for children under the age of eighteen was 19.9%, the good
news being that this was a decline from 21.8% in 2012,19 the bad news
being that the United States nevertheless ranks among the worst in
developed countries.20 One final statistic regarding poverty in the United
States: The number of homeless people—people with no private place to
call their own—in 2013 was estimated to be about nineteen out of every ten
thousand people.21
Turn now to the Gap Thesis, which refers to the difference between
people with a lot and people with very little. According to a recent report,
inequality regarding both income (how much you make) and wealth (how
much you have) has been on the increase in the United States.22 The top
10% of earners garnered half of overall income in 2012, the highest
proportion since records have been kept.23 As to wealth, in 2013, the top
10% held about 75%,24 the top 3% about 54.4%,25 and the top 1% about
36%.26 Even those in the top 1% suffered inequality of a sort: “the
wealthiest 0.1 percent, and especially the 0.01 percent, have left the rest of
the 1 percent in the dust.”27
17. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 12 (2014).
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 12.
20. See Christopher Ingraham, Child poverty in the U.S. is among the worst in the developed
world, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2
014/10/29/child-poverty-in-the-u-s-is-among-the-worst-in-the-developed-world/.
21. NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA
2014, at 9, n.2 (2014). For discussion of homelessness and the extraordinary limitations it imposes on
individual freedom, see Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
295 (1991).
22. See Annie Lowrey, The Wealth Gap in America Is Growing, Too, N.Y. TIMES (April 2, 2014,
10:15 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/the-wealth-gap-is-growing-too/?_r=0
23. Id.
24. See Top 10 percent of US households control nearly 75 percent of all wealth, MY BUDGET
360, http://www.mybudget360.com/wealth-inequality-america-top-10-percent-of-us-households-control75-percent-of-wealth/ (last visited May 28, 2015).
25. See Wealth Inequality, INEQUALITY.ORG, http://inequality.org/wealth-inequality (last visited
May 28, 2015) (“The top 3 percent now hold over double the wealth of America’s poorest 90 percent of
families”).
26. See Aimee Picchi, The “1 percent” are richer than you thought, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2014,
12:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-1-percent-are-richer-than-you-thought/.
27. Lowrey, supra note 22. In this connection, consider a recent article, Thomas Piketty &
Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in the Long Run, 344 SCIENCE 838 (2014), reporting that wealth and income

594

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Recall that in speaking of his Gap Thesis, Munzer suggested that
extreme and visible inequalities between the best off and the worst off are
unjustifiable if they lower self-esteem and create understandable
resentment.28 In that connection, let me mention a few recent items from
the news reporting on the rich versus the poor in New York City. The first
item has to do with housing, which is very expensive in The Big Apple and
in short supply for low-income residents. A report bearing the title “Don’t
Let Rich People Own Apartments They Don’t Live In” asserts that
“thousands of spacious New York apartments are bought and held by
wealthy people who do not actually live in them. They are used instead as
wildly expensive substitutes for hotels.”29 At the same time, the City “has
54,000 people living in homeless shelters and a public housing system with
a waiting list of a quarter-million people and $18 billion in unfunded budget
needs.”30
New York City has an Inclusionary Housing Program that permits
developers to build larger-than-usual residential projects if, as part of the
project, they also provide low-income housing, on-site or off-site.31 One
recently approved development has on-site affordable housing, but lowincome residents must use a different entrance than the one provided for
their rich neighbors, perhaps to spare the latter “‘from the terrible
awkwardness of regularly encountering people whose lifestyles differ from
theirs, or something.’”32 Yes, perhaps, but consider also the scheme from

distributions at the top of the distribution are fractal in nature, meaning that patterns seen in examining,
say, the share of the top 10% as compared to the bottom 90% repeat themselves in an increasingly more
fine grained pattern: the wealth of the top 1% increases faster than the wealth of the top 10%, the wealth
of the top 0.1% faster than that of the top 1%, the wealth of the top 0.01% faster than that of the top
0.1%, and so on. See also Neil Irwin, The $179 Million Picasso That Explains Global Inequality, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/upshot/the-179-million-picasso-that-explain
s-global-inequality.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (drawing conclusions from Piketty and Saez’s article
regarding wealth inequality).
28. See MUNZER, supra note 12, at 249.
29. Hamilton Nolan, Don’t Let Rich People Own Apartments They Don’t Live In, GAWKER.COM
(Aug. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://gawker.com/don’t-let-rich-people-own-apartments-they-don’t-live-in1621527767. According to a New York magazine article (with the title “Stash Pad”) mentioned in the
Gawker.com story, “[t]he Census Bureau estimates that 30 percent of all apartments in the quadrant from
49th to 70th Streets between Fifth and Park are vacant at least ten months a year.” Andrew Rice, Stash
Pad, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Jun. 29, 2014), http://nymag.com/news/features/foreigners-hiding-money-newyork-real-estate-2014-6/index1.html.
30. Nolan, supra note 29.
31. See generally Zoning Tools: Inclusionary Housing, NYC Planning, NYC.GOV, http://www.n
yc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zh_inclu_housing.shtml (last visited May 28, 2015).
32. Lucy Westcott, New York City Approves ‘Poor Door’ for Luxury Apartment Building,
NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2014 5:49 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-city-approves-poor-doorluxury-apartment-building-260218 (quoting Caroline Bankoff, Fancy Upper West Side Building Will
Have a Separate Door for Poor People, N.Y. MAGAZINE (July 21, 2014 4:12 PM), http://nymag.com/da
ily/intelligencer/2014/07/building-will-have-a-separate-door-for-poor.html).
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the viewpoint of the low-income residents, regularly and publicly identified
as people of lower status.
A second item: Auction prices for fine art have soared unbelievably as
of late. The New York Times reported that Christie’s sold more than $1
billion worth of art in three days in early May 2015, in “a spectacle of
excess at the highest level,” according to one observer.33 The reporter saw
the event as “a symptom of widening income inequality” and a reflection of
the popularity of expensive art as a “status symbol,”34 just as are separate
entrances for the wealthy (indicating high status) and the poor (low status).
Across the world and over a long period of human history, the sorts of
affronts worked by conspicuous consumption were the target of sumptuary
laws, defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] statute, ordinance, or
regulation that limits the expenditures that people can make for personal
gratification or ostentatious display.”35 Sumptuary laws are pretty much
unknown today (although we can see distant relatives, such as luxury taxes
on the purchase of fancy automobiles). However justified they might be
thought to be, they are unlikely to be revived. People offended by the
prevailing distribution of rights to property in the United States will have to
look elsewhere for reform. A pertinent question is whether the law of
property provides a means.
C. Property Law and Rights to Property
In considering this issue, it is important to bear in mind that property
law viewed as a system has two components. The first has to do with the
body of doctrine governing the rights of people who are owners; the second
has to do with the distribution of the right to be owners. So, for example,
under the early common law property system, married women had
essentially no rights to own property, but this was eventually changed by
Married Women’s Property Acts, such that now women have the same
ownership rights as men.36 Modern property doctrine treats women just as
it treats owners generally—in an evenhanded fashion. Yet notice that the
early common law system likewise treated all owners in an evenhanded
fashion, but happened to declare that married women could not be owners.
The Married Women’s Property Acts, then, did not change the first
component of the property system, but did change the second by working a
33. Scott Reyburn, Christie’s Has Art World’s First $1 Billion Week, Widening Divide With
Sotheby’s, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/arts/design/art-auction-sale
s-at-christies-top-1-billion-this-week.html (internal quotations omitted).
34. Id.
35. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009). For a general account on sumptuary law,
see ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY LAW (1996).
36. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 384-85 (8th ed. 2014).
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fundamental redistribution of the right to be an owner. There have been
arguments advanced over the years to make other fundamental changes of a
similar sort—for example, by way of a constitutional right to the minimal
entitlements necessary to a decent life.37 But no such constitutional right
has been created by constitutional amendment or recognized by the
Supreme Court. Legislation provides another means of reform, but nothing
fundamental has been enacted and, especially at the federal level, is
impossible to imagine given the divisive political climate.
An alternative approach is to argue for judicial reform of the common
law property system. Arguments of this sort have been around for some
years. Morris Cohen, a legal philosopher, acknowledged in an article
written on the eve of the Great Depression that “the essence of private
property is always the right to exclude others,”38 but he maintained that this
right “must be supported by restrictions or positive duties on the part of the
owners, enforced by the state as much as the right to exclude others . . . .”39
Some 50 years later, C.B. Macpherson argued in a similar vein that the right
not to be excluded was as much the essence of property as the right to
exclude.40
Viewpoints like those of Cohen and Macpherson might seem to
represent a radical reformation of Blackstone’s notion of property as “sole
and despotic dominion,”41 but that is hardly the case. Blackstone’s
statement was misleading even in his own day, as he well knew. In an
earlier, less well-known passage of his Commentaries, he observed that the
right of property in an owner “consists in the free use, enjoyment, and
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only
by the laws of the land,”42 which imposed any number of limitations on the
rights to exclude, use, and transfer.43 Thus, Cohen and Macpherson’s ideas
were entirely consistent with the common law principles of private
ownership.
This can be said as well of a current round of scholarship that echoes to
some degree the views of Cohen and Macpherson. I refer to it as the
37. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum
Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525 (1993) (discussing the arguments and obstacles the poor
confront).
38. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 12 (1927).
39. Id. at 21.
40. C.B. MACPHERSON, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 201 (1978).
41. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
42. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., Frederick G. Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in NOMOS XXII:
PROPERTY 101, 119-24 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (discussing limitations on
property rights during Blackstone’s time, such as those arising from the law of nuisance, exceptions to
trespass, the right of the sovereign to expropriate, rules of inheritance, and so forth); see also David B.
Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEOR. INQ. L. 103 (2009).
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Progressive Property movement, because some of its chief contributors refer
to it that way in A Statement of Progressive Property.44 Here are the
highpoints of that statement:


The common conception of property as protection of
individual control over valued resources is both
intuitively and legally powerful.
Sometimes the
expression of this idea focuses on the right to exclude
others and sometimes on the free use of what one owns.
. . . [These are] inadequate as the sole basis for
resolving property conflicts or for designing property
institutions.



Property
values.



Some of these values promote individual interests,
wants, needs, desires, and preferences. Some promote
social interests, such as environmental stewardship,
civil responsibility, and aggregate wealth. Others
govern human interaction to ensure that people relate to
each other with respect and dignity.



These values are not solely a matter of satisfying
personal preferences. Values can generate moral
demands and obligations.



Values promoted by property include life and human
flourishing, the protection of physical security, the
ability to acquire knowledge and make choices, and the
freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms. They
also include wealth, happiness, and other aspects of
individual and social well-being.

implicates

plural

and

incommensurable

44. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009) [hereinafter A
Statement of Progressive Property]. This item appears in a special issue of the Cornell Law Review,
entitled Property and Obligation. In my discussion, I focus mostly on one article in the issue, see
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
745 (2009). Other works of interest in the progressive property vein, in addition to the articles within the
special issue of the Cornell Law Review, include: GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY (2012); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON
THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS
MEANING AND POWER (2003).
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Property confers power. It allocates scarce resources
that are necessary for human life, development, and
dignity. Because of the equal value of each human
being, property laws should promote the ability of each
person to obtain the material resources necessary for
full social and political participation.45

Notice that the Progressive Property statement adopts a vision of a just
system of property similar to that set out by Professor Munzer.46 Also in
accordance with Munzer, the Progressive Property scholarship devotes most
of its pages to philosophical arguments in support of a property system that,
as noted in the last paragraph of the Statement of Progressive Property
quoted just above, aims to “promote the ability of each person to obtain the
material resources necessary for full social and political participation.”47
However, the scholarship gives little concrete attention to the problem or
problems that such a system is suppose to help solve. For example, no data,
such as that sketched in Section B above, is set out in the scholarship.
Instead, there is simply an assumption that matters are not right. Let us
forgive this neglect of empiricism on the ground that reasonably finegrained attention to the facts is unnecessary because any intelligent citizen
should know that there is a poverty problem in the United States. The
questions are why, and what to do about it.
Judging at least from the Progressive Property literature of interest to
me here, an important why is a certain prevailing academic mindset about
property, and an important what to do is doctrinal change of a particular
sort. Regarding mindset, the culprit is law-and-economics, which, as
Gregory Alexander rightly notes, “has dominated property scholarship” in
recent years.48 He concedes that law-and-economics theory provides
important insights, but finds it deeply flawed by “the poverty of its analysis
of moral values and moral issues [and its] exclusive concern with aggregate
social welfare . . . .”49 Its practitioners, in his view, focus too much on the
rights of property owners and too little on their obligations—too much, in
particular, on the right of owners to exclude, as opposed to the obligation of
owners to others, both owners and non-owners.50 A better approach, in
Alexander’s view, is to focus on what he calls a “social-obligation norm in
American property law,”51 a norm that would recognize not just the right of
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 44, at 743-44.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 44, at 744.
Alexander, supra note 44, at 750.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 747-48.
Id. at 748.
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owners to exclude but also, as Macpherson put it earlier, “the right [in
others] not to be excluded.”52
Professor Alexander’s account is both normative and positive; it argues
that the norm he has in mind should be the law, and that, to some degree, it
is the law, although it appears “only sporadically and implicitly.”53
Regarding the latter, his chief doctrinal examples include extended
discussion of entitlement sacrifices worked by eminent domain and
nuisance law, and use sacrifices worked by historic preservation regulations,
environmental regulations, and rules placing limitations on the right to
exclude (regarding public access to beaches, for example).54
All of these examples could in my view be explained in terms of, say,
the law-and-economics viewpoint, but I accept the social-obligation norm as
an interesting competing viewpoint. And to his credit, Alexander
acknowledges that the viewpoint reflects considerable respect for protection
of property rights in most cases.55 However, Alexander insists that
“American property law is not solely about either individual freedom or
cost-minimization. It is also about human flourishing and supporting the
communities that enable us to live well-lived lives.”56
And so perhaps it is, but not yet in a way that grants rights to property
of the sort I have been discussing. If indeed the social-obligation norm is
reflected in property law, it is mostly by way of limiting the rights of
property owners. The limitations, moreover, do little if anything to feed the
hungry, shelter the homeless, clothe the cold, treat the ill, or educate the
masses. It is, to be sure, good that those in need have access to historic
sites, to beaches and other recreational facilities, to public parks and streets,
to a healthy natural environment, and so forth, but to observe that they
thereby promote human flourishing is something of a joke, I reckon, to
those dwelling below the poverty line—akin to telling people with
inadequate means to nutritious meals that they are free to eat cake.
When Macpherson wrote of an individual right not to be excluded by
others, he had in mind a “right to equal access to the means of labour and/or
the means of life.”57 I believe the Progressive Property scholars have
essentially the same objective in mind, but limitations on the rights of
property owners do not accomplish it. Access to land owned by others is
not the same as owning land oneself, especially in terms of autonomy. This
is the difference between rights of property owners and a right to be
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

MACPHERSON, supra note 40, at 201.
Alexander, supra note 44, at 748.
See id. at 773-810.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 818.
MACPHERSON, supra note 40, at 201.
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property owners, and expanding the right to be property owners is
something that the common law courts in their common law mode are
extraordinarily unable to accomplish. Revolution aside, such a fundamental
redistribution of wealth will be achieved by the political system if it is
achieved at all, and the prognosis is not promising. In an essay published
some years ago, Jean Baechler ventured the view that “the politics of
redistribution, taken by itself, has every chance of falling to its lowest
common denominator, namely, public relief of misery.”58 One could argue
that this is what we see today, with not much likelihood of change. A recent
item in the New York Times points out that since the 1970s, wealth and
income inequality has been on the rise, making it reasonable to suppose that
public opinion favoring redistribution has been on the rise as well, but it has
not: “Americans’ desire to soak the rich has diminished even as the rich
have more wealth available that could, theoretically, be soaked.”59 So long
as attitudes like this persist, there will be no fundamental right of everyone
to own property. Property law cannot rise above the culture in which it is
embedded.

58. Jean Baechler, Liberty, Property, and Equality, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, supra note 43, at
285.
59. Neil Irwin, Why Americans Don’t Want to Soak the Rich, N.Y. Times (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/upshot/why-americans-dont-want-to-soak-the-rich.html?abt=0002
&abg=1.

